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An Introduction to Individual Disability Income 
Insurance 
Mark j. Chartier* 
Abstract 
There are several actuarial software packages purporting to calculate expected 
benefit cash flows on disability income insurance policies. To the author's 
knowledge, however, there is no published text that explains how to perform 
these calculations. This paper is intended to fill this gap in the literature. It 
describes some of the more common techniques for pricing disability income 
insurance. Those techniques for which claim costs can be used and th!Jse for 
which the pricing actuary must project cash flows are identified. 
Key words and phrases: benefits, claim costs, cash flows, incidence rate, expo-
sure, survivorship function 
1 Purpose and Product Features 
1.1 Purpose 
One of the primary purposes of life insurance is to protect a family 
from the catastrophic financial consequences of a breadwinner's pre-
mature death. Death is not the only reason, however, that a breadwin-
ner may be unable to work. For example, what if the breadwinner is a 
victim of serious illness or injury and is unable to work for a significant 
period of time? Will his or her dependents be worse off financially than 
if he or she had died? 
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This other need defines the purpose of disability income insurance: 
to provide income when illness or injury renders the insured unable to 
work. The need is all too real and is arguably greater than that for life 
insurance. For example, according to the 1980 Commissioner's Stan-
dard Ordinary Table, l a male age 35 has a 0.00211 probability of dying 
during the next year. According to the 1985 Commissioner's Individual 
Disability Tables A, 2 the probability that a 35 year old male will suf-
fer a disability lasting at least 90 days at some time during the next 
year ranges from 0.00164 in the best occupation class to 0.01176 in 
the worst occupation class. 
Most United States residents have two forms of disability income 
protection provided by social insurance: workers' compensation and 
Social Security. Although workers' compensation is technically liabil-
ity insurance for an employer, it effectively provides disability income 
protection to the employee. There are, however, some important limi-
tations to workers' compensation. An obvious one is that it only pro-
tects employees from disabilities that are work-related. Another is that 
some segments of the population (the self-employed, for example) are 
not covered. 
Social Security provides much broader protection. The D in OASm3 
represents the United States' most comprehensive response to the need 
to care for the incapacitated. There are, however, serious shortcomings 
to Social Security including: (i) a restrictive definition of disability that 
makes it difficult to qualify for benefits; (ii) a claim settlement process 
that does not determine eligibility for benefits on a consistent basis; 
and (iii) an absence of promises. Entitlement to Social Security benefits 
of any kind is a statutory right (not a contractual right) and the terms of 
coverage can be changed at any time by an act of Congress. No promise 
is made about the level of benefits, the size or the timing of any cost 
of living adjustment, or the definition of disability used to determine 
eligibility for benefits. Only private insurers can make promises by en-
tering into contracts with private individuals. See Rejda (1984, Chapter 
2, pp. 19-46) for a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of 
Social Security. 
The providers of individual disability income insurance form a small 
segment of the insurance industry. Based on net earned premium fig-
l"Report of the Committee to Recommend New Mortality Tables for Valuation." 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXIII (1981): 617-674. 
2"Report of the Committee to Recommend New Disability Tables for Valuation." 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXVII (1985): 449-601. 
3 Old-Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDI) refers to the monthly 
retirement, disability, and survivor benefits paid under the United States Social Security 
system. 
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ures for 1992, more than half of the business is written by only four 
carriers: Paul Revere, Provident Life and Accident, Northwestern Mu-
tual, and UNUM. (See Conning & Company, 1993.) 
Similarly, not many Americans purchase individual disability income 
insurance. According to Conning & Company (1993), 75 percent of the 
individual disability income insurance in-force is on the top occupation 
class, the professional elite consisting mainly of physicians, attorneys, 
highly paid corporate executives, certified public accountants, actuar-
ies, etc. For example, Soule (1993), reports that 80 percent of dentists, 
78 percent of physicians, and 68 percent of lawyers have disability in-
come insurance. The situation with group disability income insurance 
is slightly better. Contrary to popular belief, however, most Americans 
do not have group long-term disability income protection. According 
to Goldman (1990), while there were over 50 million workers covered 
by short-term disability (benefit period of two years or less) in 1986, 
the number covered by group long-term disability was small, less than 
20 million. 
1.2 Policy Features 
Below is a list of some of the more common policy features of indi-
vidual4 disability income insurance. This is by no means an exhaustive 
description. The reader should consult Kidwell (1988, Chapter 3) for 
more detailed information. 
1. Rate Structure: Premiums can be level (in which case they vary 
by issue age but not by attained age) or they can increase by at-
tained age. Level premium rate structures are common and in-
volve a significant prefunding of future benefits. This prefunding 
is quantified in the active life reserve (to be discussed later). 
2. Renewability: Three categories are common: nonrenewable for 
stated reasons only, guaranteed renewable, and noncancellable. 
A contract is nonrenewable for stated reasons only if the insurer 
reserves the right to cancel coverage but may do so only for one 
of the reasons stated in the contract. For example, the contract 
might specify that the insured must be working full time in order 
to renew. The premium rate the insured pays is not guaranteed 
for the life of the contract. 
4Group disability income coverage is a different topic. This important subject will 
not be discussed here. See Goldman (1990) for more on group disability income 
insurance. 
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A contract is guaranteed renewable if the insurer is contractually 
prohibited from canceling coverage for any reason other than fail-
ure to pay premiums. The premium rate the insured pays is not 
guaranteed. Even when the contract has a level rate structure, the 
insurer reserves the right to increase the rate if experience is sig-
nificantly worse than anticipated when the contract originally was 
priced. 
The most generous renewability provision is found in noncan-
cellable contracts. The insurer makes timely payment of premi-
ums the only condition for renewal and guarantees the premium 
rate until policy expiration, typically at age 65. An insured who 
buys such a contract with a level rate structure at age 25 will pay 
the same rate for his or her coverage for the next 40 years. 
3. Elimination Period: The elimination period is the period of time 
for which the policyholder self-insures. The insured only begins 
to accrue benefits after the elimination period is completed. The 
elimination period can be likened to the deductible on a medical 
expense policy. Let's illustrate the concept by a few examples. 
Suppose the insured has a contract that, should he or she become 
disabled, will pay an annuity of $100 per month.s Furthermore, 
assume the insured is disabled for 45 days before returning to 
work: 
(a) If the insured's contract has a zero day elimination period, 
he or she is paid $150 (one and a half month's benefit) for 
those 45 days. 
(b) If the insured's contract has a 30 day elimination period, he 
or she would be paid $50 (half a month's benefit) for the 
remaining 15 days. 
(c) If the insured's contract has a 60 day elimination period, he 
or she would accrue no benefit because the disability did not 
extend beyond the end of the 60 day elimination period. 
This paper distinguishes time on claim and time disabled. A claim 
does not begin until the elimination period is completed. The 
length of time on claim plus the length of the elimination period 
equals the length of time disabled. Because the longer the elimi-
nation period, the lower the premium the insured must pay, the 
choice of an elimination period is important. It should reflect the 
sOne month is assumed to have 30 days 
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insured's judgment of how long he or she can rely on personal 
savings. Elimination periods of 30, 60, and 90 days are common. 
For financially well-endowed individuals, 180 day and 365 day 
elimination periods are available. 
4. Benefit Period: This is the maximum length of time an insured 
can collect benefits for a single claim. Benefit periods can range 
from a few months to the entire life of the insured. A common 
benefit period is one that would allow the policyholder to remain 
on claim until age 65. 
5. Definition of Disability: Determining whether to pay a life in-
surance benefit is a relatively straightforward matter. This is not 
the case for disability income insurance; the potential for poli-
cyholder abuse is enormous. It is essential that the policy state 
as precisely as possible what constitutes a disability. Two defini-
tions are common. The most generous is the regular occupation 
definition. According to this definition, the insured is disabled 
if an illness or injury renders her or him unable to perform the 
substantial and material duties of her or his regular occupation; 
whether the insured is able to perform the duties of some other 
occupation is irrelevant. 
An alternative is the reasonable occupation definition under which 
the insured is disabled if he or she is unable to do the substantial 
and material duties of any reasonable occupation. A reasonable 
occupation is one the insured could be expected to perform by 
virtue of education, training, and work experience. Some insurers 
modify the definition of a reasonable occupation by asserting that 
due regard must be given to the insured's earnings before disabil-
ity began. The intent is to protect the insured from being forced 
into an occupation in which he or she would suffer a substantial 
loss of income. 
Let us illustrate the difference between these two definitions with 
a realistic example. Suppose an insured's regular occupation is 
that of a surgeon. The insured begins to suffer from an impair-
ment in her or his right wrist, perhaps carpal tunnel syndrome 
or arthritis. He or she no longer can perform surgery. But by en-
tering general medical practice, the surgeon still can earn a much 
higher income than that of the average individual. Is the surgeon 
disabled? By the reasonable occupation definition, the answer is 
no; the surgeon now can perform the duties of what is for her or 
him a reasonable occupation. By the regular occupation defini-
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tion, however, the surgeon is considered to be disabled because 
he or she cannot perform the duties of his or her regular occupa-
tion. Therefore, the surgeon can collect benefits while she or he 
earns income from a new occupation! 
Some policies offer a hybrid of the two definitions. For example, 
the regular occupation definition may apply only during the first 
24 months of a claim. After 24 months, a claimant can continue to 
collect benefits only if he or she meets the reasonable occupation 
definition. 
6. Partial or Residual Disability: The above definitions refer to to-
tal disability, the complete inability to perform the substantial and 
material duties of the insured's regular or some other reasonable 
occupation. What if the disabled insured can work, but only on 
a part-time basis? What if she or he can work full-time but can 
perform only some of the key duties of the job? If a contract only 
covers total disability, he or she is not eligible for benefits. Some 
contracts will pay a fraction of the policy's full benefit amount 
under a partial or residual disability clause. Under a partial dis-
ability clause, the benefit is a function of time unable to work. 
Under a residual disability clause, the benefit is a function of in-
come lost. Contracts providing residual benefits are common and 
will be discussed later. 
7. Presumptive Disability: Some contracts will assert that for cer-
tain conditions, the policyholder will be presumed disabled and 
able to collect benefits even if he or she continues to work and 
suffers no loss of income. Such conditions might include total 
blindness in both eyes, loss of use of both hands or both feet, to-
tal deafness, etc. The presumptive disability provision also might 
extend the benefit period under such circumstances, e.g., pay ben-
efits for life in case of blindness. 
8. Protection Against Overinsurance: The insured is not supposed 
to profit from a disability claim. Therefore, the insurer should not 
issue so much coverage that when social insurance and any other 
private insurance is added, the insured's income on claim is higher 
than the income before disability. There are policy provisions that 
can be added to a disability contract to provide the insurer with 
added protection against overpayment. 
One example is a coordination with social insurance clause. Un-
der such a clause, the amount the insured is paid by his or her 
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private insurer can be reduced dollar for dollar by what he or she 
receives from social insurance. If a contract has a benefit amount 
of $1000 per month and a claimant receives $400 a month from 
OASDI, then he or she will receive only $600 per month from pri-
vate insurance. Other variations are possible. The formula for 
coordination of benefits need not be a dollar-for-dollar offset. It 
may be a percentage reduction in the event social insurance is 
received. 
The above provision applies only to social insurance. It does not 
take into account other private insurance policies the insured may 
own. A more comprehensive provision is the relation of earnings 
to insurance clause, an optional provision under the NAIC'S6 Uni-
form Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provision Law. For 
a discussion of the Uniform Law, see O'Grady (1988, Appendix 2). 
Such a clause allows the benefit the insurer would pay to be re-
duced proportionately. Suppose that the insured's income before 
disability is only 90 percent of the sum of all of his or her disabil-
ity income insurance benefits. If a contract contained the relation 
of earnings to insurance clause, the insurer would pay only 90 
percent of the policy's benefit amount. Neither of the above pro-
visions typically is found in contracts sold to the industry's target 
market, the self-employed professional; intense competition has 
pushed the industry to produce very generous contracts. 
9. Waiver of Premiums: The typical waiver of premium provision 
specifies that once a disabled insured has satisfied a certain wait-
ing period (typically longer than the elimination period), premi-
ums will be waived for the duration of disability and any premium 
paid after commencement of disability will be reimbursed. 
10. Riders: Various optional benefits can be purchased to supplement 
the basic contract. A rider can be purchased to adjust benefits 
for cost of living increases while the insured is on claim. The 
insured can pay for the right to purchase additional coverage in 
the future without evidence of medical insurability. The insured 
could purchase a social insurance contingency rider; if he or she 
applies for Social Security and is turned down, he or she can collect 
benefits under this rider. Halpern (1979) discusses how to price 
such a rider. 
6The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is an association con-
sisting of state insurance commissioners. The NAIC drafts model laws and recom-
mends their adoption by state legislatures. The NAIC has no legal authority to force 
states to enact its recommendations. 
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1.3 Risk Variables 
Claim experience is affected by many variables including the fol-
lowing: age, gender, elimination period, benefit period, relationship 
of benefit amount to income, occupation class, and state (geographi-
cal location) of residence. The effects of some of these variables are 
quantified in the rate manual. For example, premium rates increase 
with issue age and benefit period, and they decrease with elimination 
period. Some insurers use a single rate manual for the entire nation, 
others have surcharges in high risk states and discounts in low risk 
states. Women, especially those in the child-bearing ages, tend to be 
charged a higher rate than men, a practice justified by higher claim in-
cidence rates. Occupation class is a crucial risk variable in disability 
income insurance. As a life insurance risk, a carpenter may be no dif-
ferent from an office worker; however, this is not the case in disability 
income insurance. Disability insurers therefore group occupations into 
broad risk classes. The class charged the lowest premium rate normally 
contains highly skilled professionals: physicians, lawyers, accountants, 
etc. The class charged the highest premium rate normally contains oc-
cupations involving substantial manual labor. 
Unfortunately, the risk variable that is the hardest to measure (and 
is probably the most significant) is the motivation to work. A highly 
motivated insured with some health problems may be a better risk than 
a healthy insured who is willing to turn a questionable condition into a 
claim. The problems associated with malingering make it more difficult 
for the underwriter to judge the disability risk than to judge the life risk. 
It is crucial that no applicant be allowed to purchase a higher benefit 
amount than is justified by his or her income. 
1.4 Overview 
We will explore some of the mathematics of disability income in-
surance in the U.S. and Canada. In particular, Section 2 describes the 
underlying model and the basic notation used throughout the paper. 
Section 3 describes the concept of claims costs and contrasts it with 
benefit cash flows. The statutory active life reserve and the disabled life 
reserve are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes two approaches 
to calculating profits: the claim cost profit model and the statutory profit 
model. Section 6 provides an overview of the techniques used in pricing 
disability income insurance: the loss ratio technique, the percentage of 
premium profit method, and the asset share and the return on invest-
ment techniques. Section 7 shows how to calculate cash flows. Section 
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8 deals with waiver of premiums. Section 9 investigates the impact of 
relaxing some of the assumptions (in Section 2) on the model. Section 
10 reviews a sample asset share calculation presented by Bluhm and 
Koppel (1988, Chapter 4). The appendix contains a numerical example. 
For an overview of the mathematics of disability income insurance 
in Europe, see Gregorius (1993), Hertzman (1993), Mackay (1993), and 
Segerer (1993). 
2 The Model 
Consider a closed block of individual disability income insurance 
poliCies (to be described in Section 2.1). This block is assumed to consist 
of homogeneous business cells in which all policyholders have common 
parameters (characteristics) such as issue age, occupation class, elimi-
nation period, waiting period for waiver of premiums, and gender. Each 
cell is defined by the value of e, a vector of parameters. To be precise, 
e = (issue age, gender, occupation class, elimination period, waiting 
period for waiver of premiums). For example, a cell may consist of 
policies sold to female surgeons with issue age 45, a 30 day elimina-
tion period, and a 180 day waiting period for waiver of premiums. This 
yields e = (45, female, surgeon, 30, 180). 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the symbol e will be used to de-
note a particular business cell. We will develop functions and expres-
sions that are dependant on e. In most of these cases, e appears as a 
subscript. 
2.1 The Policy 
Consider an individual disability income insurance policy with the 
following features: 
1. The policy is sold only to those individuals who are active (not 
disabled) at the time of issue. 
2. An insured receives benefits if and only if the insured is disabled 
for a continuous period of time in excess of the elimination period. 
The definition of disability is not important here, suffice to say 
that the definition chosen will affect the probabilities of disability 
and recovery. 
3. Premiums are not necessarily level and are paid annually. 
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4. There is a waiver of premium if the insured remains disabled for 
a period of time in excess of the waiting period for waiver of pre-
miums. Premium payments resume upon recovery. 
5. Benefits are paid up to age 65. 
6. The unit of benefit is $1/12 per month. 
2.2 Mortality, Morbidity, Recovery, and Lapses 
There are three sources of decrement at work on the in-force popu-
lation: (i) voluntary lapsation; (ii) death while on claim; and (iii) death 
while not on claim. The mortality rates of insureds on claim are dif-
ferent from those of insureds not on claim. In addition, the mortality 
rates of insureds who have been on claim and who since have recovered 
may be different from those who have never been on claim. Finally, the 
voluntary lapse rates of insureds who have been on claim are almost 
certainly lower than the voluntary lapse rates of insureds who have 
never been on claim. Those who have benefited from the contract are 
more likely to hold onto it. 
In practice, the disability income insurance actuary uses a single 
set of tables, called lapse tables, to decrement the in-force population. 
These tables express the three sources of decrement mentioned above 
as a single aggregate source of decrement. Separate lapse tables for 
insureds who have been on claim and insureds who have never been on 
claim are not used. 
The in-force population can be divided into two subpopulations: the 
active population and the claim population. 
1. The active population is the population exposed to the risk of dis-
ablement. There are three sources of decrement and one source 
of increment on the active population: 
(a) Voluntary lapsation; 
(b) Death while not on claim; 
(c) Migration from the active population to the claim population; 
and 
(d) Recovery from claim (the one source of increment). 
We will assume initially that we can identify the active population 
with the in-force population. That is, the population exposed to 
risk will be calculated by taking the in-force population at time 
of issue and decrementing only for voluntary lapsation, death on 
claim, and death not on claim. 
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2. The claim population consists of those persons who are receiving 
disability benefits. Thus, disabled persons who are not receiving 
a benefit are not considered as being on claim. There are two 
sources of decrement and one source of increment on the claim 
population: 
(a) Death while on claim; 
(b) Recovery from claim; and 
(c) Going on claim (the one source of increment). 
When measuring the size of the active population during the year, 
migration to the claim population and return from claim to the active 
population will be ignored. We make this assumption for two reasons. 
First, the claim population is very small relative to the active population, 
so little error results from identifying the active population with the 
entire population in-force. Second, tracking the continuous two way 
migration between active and claim population is a tedious process, 
and we want to keep the model as simple as possible. In Section 9.2, we 
will describe a way to track this two way migration at discrete intervals. 
A set of morbidity tables with two decrements (death on claim and 
recovery from claim) is used to project increments and decrement to 
the claim population. Claim incurral is the sole source of increment. As 
with lapse rates, the disability income insurance actuary does not use 
a multiple decrement table. Instead he or she uses claim termination 
rates that combine termination due to death and recovery. 
The rate of claim incurral for insureds who have never filed a claim 
is undoubtedly different from the incurral rate for those who have filed. 
claims in the past. In practice, the disability income actuary uses ag-
gregate rates of claim incurral drawn from a single set of morbidity 
tables that do not distinguish the two groups of insureds. In addition, 
because policyholders are assumed to pay premiums annually, volun-
tary lapsations only occur at policy anniversaries. While premiums are 
being waived for a disabled insured, the policy cannot lapse. 
Given these three decrements (mortality, morbidity, and lapses) and 
the increment (recovery), a separate combined mortality-dis ability-lapse 
table is w~ed for each occupation class and gender. The mortality-
recovery table for disabled lives will be a select table with age at time 
of disability and duration of disability as the parameters in the table. 
For ease of computation, the following assumptions are made: 
1. The incidence of claim is distributed uniformly throughout the 
year. Thus, given that there are Ee(n) units of claim at the start 
of the nth policy year and that re (n) is the incidence rate of claim, 
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then the expected number of claims in the interval (t, t + dt), with 
0< t < 1, is Ee(n)re(n)dt. 
2. Deaths and lapses in the in-force population occur at the end of 
the policy year. 
3. The population on claim is so small relative to the active pop-
ulation that we initially will assume that the units of insurance 
exposed to risk are unaffected by claim incurrals and recoveries. 
The effects of relaxing these assumptions are investigated in Section 9. 
2.3 Notation 
Some of the more basic symbols used in the model will be defined 
and assumptions for the model presented. 
e = A vector of parameters that characterize each business 
cell; 
i = The valuation rate of interest; 
v = The annual discount factor, i.e., v = 1/(1 + i); 
x = The issue age, x = 15,16,17, ... ; 
z = The attained age = x + n - 1; 
n = The policy year of disablement, n = 1,2,3, ... ; 
m = The current policy year m = n, n + 1, ... ; 
e = The length of the elimination period (measured in years). 
It is the minimum length of time the insured must be 
disabled in order to qualify for benefits; 
w = The length of the waiting period (measured in years) to 
qualify for waiver of premium, with w > e; 
b = The length of the benefit period (measured in years). 
Usually the benefit period extends to age 65. Note, 
b > w > e; 
re(n) = The incidence rate of claim in the nth policy year for 
a policy with parameter e, i.e., the probability that an 
active insured (currently age x+n-1) from the business 
cell with parameter e becomes disabled and remains 
disabled for at least the length of the elimination period; 
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Ee(n) = The number of units7 of insurance exposed to risk in 
the nth policy year for a policy with parameter e; 
Pe (n) = The annual premium per unit of insurance in-force dur-
ing the nth policy year for a policy with parameter e; 
se(Y, n) = The probability that a policyholder (with parameter e) 
who is disabled in the nth policy year and remained 
disabled throughout the elimination period will stay on 
claim (Le., receive benefits) for at least Y consecutive 
years into the future. Also, Se (y, n) = 0 when y is 
greater than the length of the benefit period; 
BCe(n, m) = The benefit cash outflow in the mth policy year to claim-
ants (with parameter e) who are disabled in the nth pol-
icy year; and 
Ween, m) = The amount of premium waived at the beginning of the 
mth policy year on claimants (with parameter e) who 
are disabled in the nth policy year. 
3 Claim Cost 
Before introducing the concept of a claim cost, let us review the way 
PDBe(n), the projected death benefit cash outflow in the nth policy 
year on a single life insurance policy with parameter e, is calculated. 
Once mortality and lapse assumptions are chosen for pricing purposes, 
the life actuary easily can determine PDBe(n) as follows: 
PDBe(n) = qe(n)DBe(n) 
where qe(n) is the mortality rate in the nth policy year, and DBe(n) is 
the number of dollars of death benefit exposed to risk during the nth 
policy year for a policy with characteristics e. 
For a disability income product, however, the calculation is more 
complex because the benefit is an annuity, not a single lump sum pay-
ment. The pricing actuary Simplifies the problem by calculating a claim 
cost. For poliCies issued at age x, the claim cost associated with the nth 
policy year, CCe(n), is given by: 
CCe(n) = v e re(n)Ee(n)ae(z) 
7 A unit of insurance is defined as $1 of annual benefit paid monthly until recovery 
or the end of the benefit period. 
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where ae(x) is the actuarial present value of an annuity paying $1 per 
year (paid monthly) after the elimination period ends to a life who is 
disabled at age z in the nth policy year.8 In other words, a claim cost 
associates with a policy year the present value of all future monies that 
will be paid to a policyholder whose date of disablement is in that year. 
In life insurance, future death benefits in a closed group of co-
horts are a function of two random processes: lapses and mortality. 
In disability income insurance, the extent of future claim payments in 
a closed group of cohorts depends on lapses, the incidence of claims, 
and the severity of claims. The fact that the claim severity is random 
is one of the reasons why the claim experience on disability income 
insurance is inherently more volatile than the claim experience on life 
insurance. It is also one of the reasons why disability income insurance 
has more in common with property/casualty insurance than it has with 
life insurance. 
Lapses, the incidence of claims, and the severity of claims vary by 
age, gender, occupation class, elimination period, policy age, and the 
contract's definition of disability. They also are affected by many other 
factors, some of which the pricing actuary cannot quantify easily (such 
as the state of the economy, for example). The claim incidence rate 
increases with age. In addition, the claim incidence rate decreases as 
the elimination period increases; it is higher for women than for men, 
at least when women are in their child-bearing years-it is possible this 
relationship reverses at advanced ages. The greater the physical stress 
of an occupation, the higher is the claim incidence rate. 
The severity of a claim (Le., the annuity factor) also varies with the 
benefit period and the interest rate. The seriousness of a claim gener-
ally increases with age. On the other hand, the benefit period shrinks 
as the insured ages. A policyholder with a benefit period to age 65, for 
example, can stay on claim for ten years if disabled at age 55. He or she 
can stay on claim only for five years if disabled at age 60. This can lead 
to a curious pattern: as a block Of poliCies ages, claim costs first will 
increase. As insureds reach their late fifties or early sixties, claim costs 
can decrease as the shrinking benefit period causes claim severity to 
become smaller. 
Unlike claim incidence, claim severity rises as the elimination pe-
riod increases. This is because a long elimination period screens those 
claims that would have closed relatively early. For example, in compar-
ing an insured with a 30 day elimination period to an insured with a 
90 day elimination period, the latter must be disabled more seriously 
BEy convention, CCe(n) is valued as of the date of disablement. 
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than the former to get on claim. But if they get on claim, the latter 
is expected to remain on claim longer. The author frequently has ob-
served that claim severity in the less skilled occupation classes is less 
than that in the highly skilled occupation classes. In other words, blue 
and gray collar workers return to work faster than white collar work-
ers. This is the case even when differences in elimination period and 
age distribution are accounted for.9 
Let He (z) denote the claim cost per unit at attained age z, then: 
He(z) = vere(n)ae([z + 1/2] + e, b) (1) 
where ae ([z + 1/2] + e, b) = the actuarial present value of an annuity of 
$1 per year (paid monthly) for at most b years starting at age z + 1/2 + e 
to a life (with parameter 9) disabled at age z + 1/2. Age at disability is 
taken to be z + 1/2 because it is assumed that, on average, disability 
begins in the middle of the policy year. The annuity starts at z + 1/2 + e 
because payment commences after the elimination period is completed. 
The annuity is contingent on the insured remaining disabled. The claim 
cost now can be rewritten as 
CCe(n) = Ee(n)He(z). (2) 
4 Reserves 
First let us introduce two important items that appear on the bal-
ance sheet of the disability income insurer: the active life reserve and 
the claim reserve. Roughly speaking, the active life reserve is that part 
of the liability for future claims (yet to occur) that must be prefunded, 
and the claim reserve is the liability for claims that already have been in-
curred. In more precise language, the active life reserve is the expected 
present value of future claim costs minus the expected present value of 
future net premiums. It is analogous to the policy reserves held on life 
insurance contracts. The claim reserve is another item that makes dis-
ability income insurance similar to property/casualty insurance. It is 
the expected present value of all future payments, both contingent and 
noncontingent, that will be made on claims that have been incurred. 
For a more thorough discussion of the active life reserve and the claim 
reserve, see Bartleson (1968) and Shapland (1988, Chapter 5). 
gOne explanation may be that the higher claim incidence rate among blue collar 
workers causes the lower severity. High claim incidence means there are many claims 
for conditions that are not serious, so they close quickly. Another is that insureds in the 
lower skilled occupations have less generous contracts, giving them greater incentive 
to return to work. 
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The formula for the statutory active life reserve at the beginning of 
the nth policy year, V~aa) (x, n), on a single unit of insurance issued at 
age x and continuable until attainment of age 65 is: 
65-z 
V~aa)(x,n) = I vkkP~aa)[vl/21/2p~~1)He(z+k) -P;] (3) 
k=O 
where He is defined in equation (1), and kP~aa) is the probability that 
an active life age in cell e (with issue age x) survives k years. 10 To avoid 
cumbersome notation, the e is not shown; P; is the statutory net level 
premium payable to age 65 for a unit of insurance issued an active life 
age in cell e. 
Again, a claim is assumed to be incurred, on average, in the middle 
of the policy year; hence, the presence of 1/2 in the exponent of v 
and the subscript of the probability of survival p. We assume that the 
reserve is established on a level premium contract. The terminal active 
life reserve is calculated by multiplying the above reserve per unit by 
the number of units in-force. As equation (3) is to be used to calculate 
statutory reserves, values of H, v, p, and P will be specified by state 
regulation and may bear little resemblance to the actuary's best guess 
assumptions about interest rates and future morbidity. 
The claim reserve is more complex. At any given time, the popu-
lation of insureds on claim will be the sum of several closed cohorts. 
Each cohort is defined by the amount of time it has been on claim. Let 
Re(n, m) be the statutory claim reserve at the beginning of the mth 
policy year (or the end of the (m - 1) st policy year) on those claimants 
disabled during the nth policy year. The total claim reserve at the be-
ginning of the mth policy year, Re(m), is the sum of the claim reserve 
on m - 1 cohorts, 
m-l 
Re(m) = I Re(n, m). 
n=l 
Now Re(n, m) is a function of two quantities: (i) the number of units 
of insurance disabled in the nth year still on claim at the beginning of 
the mth year; and (ii) the claim reserve established on a single unit 
disabled in the nth year and still on claim at the beginning of the mth 
year. Later we will develop the formula for the number of units disabled 
in the nth year still on claim at the beginning of the mth year. The claim 
lOOnce a person is insured, a reserve is maintained for her or him. Even if she or he 
is on claim, an active life reserve is maintained for her or him because she or he could 
go on claim again after recovery. 
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reserve factor for a single unit of insurance disabled in the nth year and 
still on claim at the beginning of the mth year is V~ii) (n, m), i.e., 
12(b-(m-n-e-l/2» 
V(ii) ( ) _ '" ~ k/12 (ii) 
e n, m - L 12 V k/12P[z+1/21+m-n-l/2 
k=l 
(4) 
which is the present value of a $1/12 per month annuity. The notation 
k/2P~~ill/21+t denotes the probability an insured who became disabled 
at exact age z + 1/2 and has remained disabled for t years will remain on 
claim for at least another k months. The term 12 (b - (m - n -1 /2 - e» 
is the number of months remaining in the benefit period. Again, we 
assume that disablement occurs on average in the middle of the policy 
year. The values of p(ii) and v are specified by statutory regulation and 
may not coincide with the pricing actuary's best guess estimate of what 
will happen. 
Let De(n, m) be the number of units of insurance disabled in the 
nth year and still on claim at the start of the mth policy year; then 
(ii) Re(n,m) = Ve (n,m)De(n,m). (5) 
5 Profits 
We present here two general approaches to measuring profit (for a 
homogeneous group of policies with parameter e) in disability income 
insurance. Each provides a formula for annual recognition of profit. It 
should be evident by the end of this discussion that the two approaches 
do not recognize the same profit year by year. Throughout this section, 
we will drop the subscript from the symbols to reduce clutter. We must 
remember, however, that the totals in this section apply to the business 
cell with parameter e. 
5.1 The Claim Cost Profit Model 
Under a claim cost pricing model, the total profit from cell e in the 
nth policy year, PROF}fC), is given by the following formula: 
PROF}fC) = Pn + In - EXPn - COMn - CCn - (ALR~) - ALR~» (6) 
where Pn is the total premium earned; In is the total investment income; 
EXP n is the total expenses; COM n is the total commissions from cell e; 
CC n is the total claim cost incurred during the nth policy year; ALR~) is 
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the total active life reserve at the end of the year; and ALR};') is the total 
active life reserve at the beginning of the nth policy year. Premiums, 
expenses, and commissions are calculated in much the same way as 
they are for life insurance. The AIR terms are calculated by multiplying 
equation (3) by the number of units of insurance in-force, i.e., 
ALR(b) 
n v~a) (n)Ee(n) 
ALR(e) 
n V~a) (n + 1)Ee(n + 1). 
We uncover a serious flaw in the claim cost pricing model when we 
try to calculate investment income, In. The reader may be tempted to 
calculate it as: 
where i is the assumed rate of interest. Again, we have assumed that 
claim costs are incurred in the middle of the policy year. It is a mis-
take to subtract the entire value v 1/ 2CCn , however, because CCn is a 
lump sum representing a series of cash flows that may be spread over 
many future years. Only the portion that is disbursed in the current 
year should be subtracted; the insurer is free to invest the remainder 
until payment is due. Because the claim cost pricing model does not 
divide that lump sum into money disbursed now and money disbursed 
later, it cannot correctly allocate investment income by policy year. The 
statutory profit model corrects this flaw. 
5.2 The Statutory Profit Model 
Statutory book profit, PROP~), is given by the equation: 
PROP(S) 
, n Pn + In - EXPn - COMn - BENn 
- (CR~) - CR};'» - (ALR~) - ALR};'» (8) 
where BENn represents the actual benefits paid in cell e, CR};') and CR~) 
are the total claim reserve at the beginning and the end of the nth policy 
year. The only apparent difference between equations (6) and (8) is that 
claim cost has been replaced by benefits paid plus the change in claim 
reserve. Are equation (6) and equation (8) equal? They typically will not 
be. Claim costs are projected using pricing mortality-morbidity tables 
and interest rates. Statutory claim reserves are measured using statu-
tory mortality-morbidity tables and interest rates. It is highly unlikely 
that quantities derived from different assumptions will be equal. 
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Under the statutory profit model, investment income is: 
In = i X (Pn + ALR}fl + CR}fl - EXPn - COMn - v 1/ 2BENn ). (9) 
Notice that in equation (9) investment income is counted on all monies 
held in reserve and that the active life reserve earns interest, but the 
claim reserve is ignored. In equation (9), benefits paid in a given year are 
subtracted from revenue before applying an interest rate, but money for 
future benefits earns interest until the benefits are paid. If the pricing 
actuary needs to project the year by year pattern by which statutory 
profit emerges, claim costs cannot be used. The pricing actuary instead 
must calculate benefit cash flows. 
6 Overview of Pricing Techniques 
This section discusses some of the methods used to determine pre-
mium rates for disability income insurance. The list is by no means 
exhaustive. 
6.1 The Loss Ratio Technique 
Before describing this technique, we must define what is meant by 
the loss ratio. The term loss ratio usually is understood to be the frac-
tion of the policyholders' premiums that is returned in benefits. That 
sounds simple enough, yet there is great confusion about what a loss 
ratio is and significant disagreement about how it is calculated. A loss 
ratio can be retrospective or prospective. It can be applied over the 
entire life of a block of business or to a single experience year. It 
can be calculated with GAAP reserves, statutory reserves, natural re-
serves, or no reserves at all. It can be calculated using a realistic in-
terest rate, a statutory interest rate, or no interest rate at all. Claim 
settlement expenses can be added to the numerator of the loss ratio 
(property/casualty insurance) or play no part in the calculation of the 
loss ratio (health insurance). (See Pharr, 1979, with discussion.) 
For our purposes, the term loss ratio is defined to be the ratio of 
the expected present value of future benefits that will be paid over the 
business cell to the expected present value of future premiums that will 
be collected from the business cell. This is a prospective lifetime loss 
ratio. When calculating the relevant present values, the author recom-
mends that we discount for voluntary lapsation as well as mortality and 
that we use a realistic rate of interest, not the statutory valuation rate. 
This view is not shared by all actuaries. 
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Once the question of how to calculate a loss ratio is settled, the loss 
ratio technique becomes the simplest approach of all. It can be broken 
down into three steps: 
1. Calculate the present value of future claim costs on a single unit 
of insurance. 
2. Calculate a level net premium rate by dividing the result of step 1 
by an annuity factor. 
3. Calculate a gross premium by dividing the net premium from step 
2 by a target loss ratio. For example, assume the present value of 
future claim costs is $50. Assume the present value of an annuity 
due of $1 per year over the life of the insurance contract is $ 5. 
Assume the target loss ratio is 50 percent. Then 50/ (5xO.5) = $20 
is that gross premium rate for which the expected present value 
of future benefits divided by the expected present value of future 
premiums is 50 percent. Note that in step 1 you could calculate 
the present value of future benefit cash flows in place of future 
claim costs. Claim costs, however, are suited perfectly for this 
technique. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the loss ratio method. 
The most important advantage is its simplicity. The formulae are easy 
to understand, and no assumptions for future expenses are needed. 
One doesn't even need to know precisely what the commission scales 
are. This simplicity is also its most important disadvantage; the differ-
ence between gross and net premiums may not be sufficient to cover 
expenses and commissions. Nevertheless, if a company's expenses or 
commissions are unacceptably high, the pricing actuary may be com-
pelled to use the loss ratio technique. 
A minimum loss ratio is required by law or regulation in most states. 
Taking the minimum loss ratio as a pricing target, the actuary can solve 
for the maximum premium that legally can be charged. Once the actu-
ary knows how much premium is left after paying benefits, he or she 
can solve for target expense and commission levels down to which ac-
tuallevels should be managed. Another advantage is that if the target 
loss ratio is set high enough, the method automatically produces a rate 
manual whose anticipated loss ratio exceeds the required minimum. 
This has not been a significant advantage of late. Anticipating a certain 
loss ratio is one thing, experiencing it is another. Despite all the confu-
sion regarding correct loss ratio calculation, one unambiguous lesson 
has emerged from the last half of the 1980s: the least of the industry's 
worries is that the loss ratio will be too low. 
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6.2 Percentage of Premium Profit Method 
This method is similar to the equation method in life insurance ex-
cept that the present value of future death benefits is replaced by the 
present value of future claim costs. The pricing actuary takes as his or 
her target a certain percentage of the present value of premiums that 
will go to profit. The actuary projects the present value of claim costs, 
expenses, etc., and solves for that premium rate at which a sufficient 
percentage of premium will be left to meet or exceed the target set. 
Claim costs are suited perfectly to this technique. Again, the present 
value of future claim costs could be replaced by the present value of 
future benefit cash flows to obtain the same result. 
Because the percentage of premium profit method makes explicit 
provision for commissions, expenses, and taxes, it is superior to the 
loss ratio technique. A major shortcoming of the percentage of pre-
mium profit method is that it does not quantify the risk/reward re-
lationship. How great a percentage of premium profit is sufficient to 
compensate the insurer for taking the disability risk? How does a risky 
disability income portfolio with a 10 percent of premium profit com-
pare with a risk-free Treasury bill paying a 3 percent return? 
As noted earlier, disability income insurance has volatile claim ex-
perience. In part this is due to the extra random process in morbidity, 
the claim severity, and the fact that the insured exercises some control 
over morbidity, possibly electing to be on claim rather than being put 
on claim by forces beyond his or her control. Disability income insur-
ance is risky business for a variety of reasons, and the faint of heart are 
driven from the marketplace. A pricing method should produce a rate 
manual that is not merely profitable, but is more profitable than one 
for a less risky line of business. 
6.3 The Asset Share Technique 
As with life insurance, the profit target for disability income insur-
ance can be set as a certain asset share by a certain policy year. Al-
ternatively, the target could be set as a certain level of surplus by a 
certain year, where surplus could be defined as the difference between 
the asset share and the total statutory reserve. Claim costs are not 
appropriate for the calculation of asset shares. One cannot take the as-
set share equation for life insurance, substitute claim cost incurred for 
death benefits paid, and consider the result to be the disability income 
insurance asset share equation. 
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An asset share is the a<::cumulation, per unit of insurance in-force, of 
all cash inflows to date minus all cash outflows to date. Every variable 
in the equation for asset share represents a cash flow. A claim cost is 
not a cash flow, hoWever; it is a lump sum assigned to a single policy 
year and is equal to the present value of a series of cash flows that may 
spread over several future years. In the first policy year, the claim cost 
is higher than the benefit cash flow because the claim cost includes 
payments that will be made in future years. A claim cost pricing model 
understates the first year asset share. There may be subsequent years 
in which the claim cost is less than the benefit cash flow because some 
claimants disabled in prior policy years will be collecting benefits in 
the current year; each year's claim cost measures payments only to 
claimants whose disal;Jilities commenced in that year. 
Bluhm and Koppel (1988) present a sample asset share calculation. 
An attempt is made to calculate benefit cash flows using claim costs and 
changes in claim reserve. After developing our own model to project 
benefit cash flows, we will discuss some of the problems inherent in 
their method and show how it can be rehabilitated.!l 
6.4 The Return on Investment Technique 
With this method, the pricing actuary projects future book profits 
and then solves for the return on investment (ROI). The ROI is the dis-
count rate at which the present value of renewal year profits equals 
the loss in the first policy year. The profit target is a threshold ROI. In 
the author's opinion, this technique is superior to the other methods 
presented above because it quantifies the insurer's reward for bearing 
the significant risk of competing in the disability income marketplace. 
The rational investor only increases risk if he or she has a reasonable 
expectation of a higher return (and insurance company shareholders 
are, we presume, rational investors). 
If the risk of selling disability income is higher than that of selling 
term life, then the insurer is entitled to expect a higher ROI from the 
former product than from the latter. The ROI pricing technique not 
only allows the insurer to compare disability income to other products, 
but allows the insurer to tailor individual rates to each particular risks 
that it bears. For example, the insurer bears more risk when it sells a 
contract with a lifetime benefit period than when it sells a contract with 
a benefit period of only one year. The rates should be set so that the 
llThese comments are not intended to detract from the qUality of the articles con-
tained in this excellent text. The author highly recommends the O'Grady textbook. 
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insurer's expected ROI on lifetime contracts is higher than that on one 
year benefit period contracts. 
It is here that we come to the most serious defect of a pricing model 
based on claim costs instead of cash flows. While claim costs can be 
used to project the present value of profit over the entire life of a block 
of business, they cannot be used to project the year by year pattern by 
which statutory book profit emerges. Consequently, a claim cost pric-
ing model cannot measure ROI correctly. This is because claim costs 
are calculated with pricing assumptions, while statutory claim reserves 
are calculated with assumptions specified by regulatory authorities. 
If pricing assumptions are more liberal than statutory assumptions 
(not a given in today's morbidity environment), then claim costs will be 
lower than benefits paid plus change in claim reserve in the early policy 
years. At this time a claim cost pricing model will overstate statutory 
book profit. In later years the inequality will reverse as money released 
from the claim reserve makes the real book profit higher than that pre-
dicted by a claim cost pricing model. Therefore, if pricing assumptions 
are more liberal than statutory valuation assumptions, a claim cost pric-
ing model will recognize profit earlier than would emerge unqer statu-
tory accounting and will overstate the ROI that will be realized. 
In summary, if an insurer places any importance on estimating the 
asset shares or the ROI of a new disability contract it contemplates 
introducing, the actuary must translate pricing assumptions into cash 
flows, not claim costs. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to 
a model for doing this. 
7 Cash Flows on the Base Policy 
We now develop a model to calculate BCe(n, m), the value of the 
benefit cash outflow in the mth policy year to claimants with dates of 
disablement in the nth policy year. As an example, consider a business 
cell consisting of disability income poliCies that will expire five years 
after issue. Let 
BCe(1,1) BCe (1 , 2) BCe (1 , 3) BCe(1,4) BCe(1,5) 
BCe(2, 2) BCe(2,3) BCe(2,4) BCe(2,5) 
BCe(3,3) BCe(3,4) BCe(3,5) 
BCe(4,4) BCe(4,5) 
BCe(5,5) 
be the matrix of benefit cash flows. 
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The total benefit cash flow in the first year is BCe(l, 1). In the second 
policy year, money is paid to some claimants with disablement dates 
in the first policy year, BCe(l, 2), and money is paid to claimants with 
disablement dates in the second policy year, BCe (2,2). The total benefit 
cash flow in the second policy year is BCe(l, 2) + BCe(2, 2), the sum of 
the entries in the second column of the array. Likewise, the cash flow 
~n the third policy year is the sum of entries in the third column, and so 
forth for all other policy years. It is interesting to note what happens 
if we move across a row of the array rather than down a column. If 
the series of cash flows BCe (1,1), BCe (1,2), BCe (1,3), BCe(l, 4), and 
BC e (l, 5) are discounted for interest back to policy issue, the result is 
the claim cost in the first policy year. The total cash outflow in the mth 
policy year, TCOe(m), is the sum of entries in the nth column, i.e., 
m 
TCOe(m) = I BCe(k, m). 
k=l 
In addition, the total claim cost in the nth policy year, TCCe(n), is the 
result of discounting the entries in the nth row back to the nth policy 
year, i.e., 
00 
TCCe(n) = I v m - n +1/ 2BCe(n,m). 
m=n 
This illustrates the flexibility of a cash flow model. From cash flows 
you can calculate claim costs. From claim costs you cannot calculate 
cash flows. 
Next we turn our attention to the calculation of BCe(n, m) for a unit 
of benefit. This task is divided into the three cases shown below. For 
simplicity, the benefit of $1 per year is assumed to be paid continu-
ously. 
Case 1, m = n: BCe(n, m) is the benefit cash flow in the nth policy 
year to claimants with dates of disablement in that same year. Ee(n) 
units of insurance are exposed to risk at the start of the nt):l policy 
year. The number of those units that will go on claim during the time 
period (t, t + dt) (with 0 < t < 1) by completing the elimination period 
is re(n)Ee(n)dt. At time t + e these claimants will begin to accrue 
benefits. The number of units disabled during the time interval [t, t + 
dt] that are still on claim at time t + e + y is re(n)Ee(n)se(Y, n)dt. 
Each unit of insurance that is on claim at time t + e + Y is paid dy 
during the interval [t + e + y, t + e + y + dy]. The final equation is: 
fl-e fl-e-t BCe(n, n) = re(n)Ee(n) t=O y=O se(y, n)dydt. (10) 
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Note the upper limits of integration. If an insured becomes disabled 
after time t = 1 - e, he or she will not complete the elimination period 
before the end of the nth policy year. If an insured begins to accrue 
benefits at t + e, then when y > 1 - (t + e), he or she will have reached 
the end of the policy year. 
In practice, a mathematical expression for se(Y, n) may not be avail-
able. Hence, we must use tabulated values from weekly or monthly 
claim termination rates. Therefore, equation (10) is handled best by 
numerical integration. An example is provided in the appendix. 
Case 2, m = n + 1 : The calculation in this case is more complex than 
the previous case because there are two classes of claimants disabled 
in the nth policy year. One class consists of those who completed the 
elimination period before the end of the nth policy year. This class 
began to accrue benefits before the (n + l)st policy year began. The 
time of disablement for all members in this class is t < 1 - e. The other 
class consists of those with time of disablement t > 1 - e. Members of 
the latter class will not satisfy the elimination period and hence will not 
begin to accrue benefits until after the (n + 1) st policy year has begun. 
For claimants who complete the elimination period before the end 
of the nth policy year, the benefit cash outflow in the (n + l)st policy 
year is: 
BC~l) (n, n + 1) = re(n)Ee(n) f=-; I:~:~:-t se(Y, n)dydt. (ll) 
The integrand has remained the same as in Case 1, only the limits of 
integration have changed. As already pointed out for Case 1, a claim 
beginning at time t + e will have lasted for y = 1 - (t + e) years by 
the end of the nth policy year. Note that time 0 is the start of the nth 
policy year, 1 represents the end of that year, 2 represents the end of 
the (n+l)stpolicyyear, and 2- (t+e) is the time on claim for a claimant 
disabled at time t and persisting at least to the end of the (n + 1) st year. 
For those claimants disabled so late in the nth policy year they do 
not complete the elimination period until after the beginning of the 
(n + l)st year, the cash flow in the (n + l)st year is 
BCf) (n, n + 1) = re(n)Ee(n) f=l-e f:~:-t se(y, n)dydt. (12) 
It follows that 
BCe(n, n + 1) = BC~l) (n, n + 1) + BC~2) (n, n + 1). (13) 
Case 3, m > n + 1 : This is the simplest case of the three. Given, as 
we have assumed, that the elimination period is not more than one year, 
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by the end of the (n + l)st policy year all claimants with disablement 
dates in the nth policy year will have satisfied the elimination period. 
Thus 
II Im+l-n-e-t BCo(n, m) = ro(n)Eo(n) t=O y=m-n-e-t so(y, n)dydt. (14) 
8 Waiver of Premium Cash Flows 
Waiver of premiums can be modeled as a cash flow to the insured 
where the benefit is his or her premium; that is, we assume claimants 
pay their premiums and then immediately receive reimbursements from 
their insurer. Because some insurers do not pay commissions on waived 
premiums, the financial impact of the waiver benefit may be less than 
that of 100 percent reimbursement. We assume the benefit is equiv-
alent to 100 percent reimbursement and that the waiting period for 
waiver is less than one year. 
Calculating Wo(n, m) is easier than calculating BCo(n, m). While 
claim payments can occur at any time during the policy year, in our 
model premiums can be waived only on policy anniversaries, making 
Wo(n, n) = O. Thus, we only need to evaluate single integrals rather 
than double integrals. 
Case 1, m = n + 1 : Wo(n, n+ 1) is the amount of premium waived at 
the beginning of the (n + 1) st policy year on insureds with disablement 
dates in the nth policy year. Insureds disabled in the nth policy year 
divide into two classes, those disabled at time t < 1 - wand those 
disabled at time t > 1 - w. If an insured's disablement occurs at time 
t > l-w, she or he will not satisfy the waiver waiting period by the time 
the (n + 1) st premium is due, but she or he will be reimbursed once 
the waiting period is completed. If an insured's time of disablement is 
t < 1 - wand he or she still is disabled when the (n + l)st premium is 
due, it will be waived. 
First we will handle the case in which t > l-w. By our assumption of 
uniform distribution of claim incidence, the probability that an insured 
exposed during the interval 1 - w < t < 1 will go on claim is w x r 0 (n). 
But ro (n) merely gives the incidence rate of a disability lasting at least 
e units of time. In order to go on waiver, the insured must stay disabled 
an additional w - e units of time. (Recall our assumption that e :0; w.) 
Thus, the full probability that an insured will become disabled during 
the interval [1 - w, 1) and remain disabled long enough to satisfy the 
waiver of premium waiting period is w x ro(n)so(w - e, n). 
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Those insureds who were disabled in the interval (t, t + dt) with 
t < 1 - w will go on claim at time t + e and merely need to stay on claim 
for 1 - (t + e) units of time (until the start of the (n + 1) st policy year) to 
have their (n + 1)st premium waived. The probability this happens is 
re(n)se(1- e - t, n). Thus, the total premium waived on both of these 
types of insureds is: 
We(n,n + 1) Pere(n)Ee(n)[w se(w - e, n) 
fl-W + se(1 - e - t, n)dt]. t=O (15) 
Case 2, m > n + 1 : As w is not greater than one year, all claimants 
disabled in the nth policy year who still are disabled at the beginning 
of the mth policy year will be on waiver. These insureds will have 
remained on claim for m - (n + t + e) years. The premium waived 
is: 
We(n, m) = Pere(n)Ee(n) L~o se(m - n - e - t, n)dt. (16) 
In Section 2.3, we asserted that Se (t, n) = 0 when t is greater than the 
length of the benefit period. The pricing actuary must bear in mind 
that the benefit period for waiver of premium need not be equal to the 
policy's base benefit period. If periods are not equal, then the survivor-
ship function used to project We (n, m) will be different from that used 
to project BCe(n, m). 
Even a contract with a benefit period as short as one year typically 
will permit the insured to remain on waiver until he or she attains the 
age at which the policy expires. If a claimant still is disabled after he 
or she reaches the end of the benefit period, the waiver of premium 
provision will keep the policy in-force. The policy is still of value be-
cause he or she later may recover, return to work, resume payment of 
premiums, and then go on claim again. The benefit period is a limit on 
the amount of time the insured can collect for a single claim, not a limit 
on the total time the insured may collect during the life of the pOlicy.12 
9 Modifications to the Model 
With slight modifications, the model can be adapted to situations 
that do not fit all of the assumptions listed in Section 2. 
12 During a claim audit, the author came across some insureds who twice had collected 
benefits successfully for the maximum length of time. 
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9.1 Nonannual Premium Payments 
If premiums are paid j times per year, the units of insurance exposed 
to risk no longer will be constant between policy anniversaries. In this 
case, we need to make Ee(n) a function of the variable t as well as the 
variable n. For the time being, let us ignore the effects of claim inci-
dence and recovery. In this case, let q~W) (n) be the policy withdrawal 
rate in the nth policy year and EV) (n, t) be the expected number of 
units in-force t (0 :0:; t :0:; 1) years after the start of the nth policy year 
given that premiums are paid j times per year. It easily is seen that 
assuming lapses occur at the time of premium payment. The [y] nota-
tion refers to the greatest integer less than or equal to y. 
9.2 Claim Incidence and Recovery 
Insured lives constantly are migrating between the population ex-
posed to risk for being on claim and the actual population on claim. In 
Section 2 and in equation (17) we chose to ignore this continual decre-
ment and increment under the assumption that in any given policy year 
the population on claim is small relative to the active population. If this 
assumption is relaxed, however, the expected exposure is given by the 
following: 
EU)(n ~ + t) 
e 'j 
EU) ( k + 1) e n, . 
J 
(1- tre(n))EV)(n,~) for 0:0:; t < IIJ (18) 
J 
(1- ~(re(n) + q~W)(n)))EV)(n,~) (19) 
J J 
for k = 1,2, ... , (j - 1). Again, we have assumed the uniform distribu-
tion of claims hypothesis. 
Tracking the inflow of insurance units as claimants recover and re-
turn to work is more complex. In order to track this inflow continu-
ously, we need an aggregate rate of claim recovery. Remember that the 
claim population consists of distinct cohorts of individuals who were 
disabled at different attained ages and at different policy durations. 
The rate at which a cohort recovers is a strong function of how long 
that cohort has been on claim. In general, the longer an insured has 
been on claim, the less likely he or she is to recover in the near future. 
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The aggregate inflow of recovering insureds is a mixture of lives from 
cohorts that are recovering at different rates. 
To simplify matters, we will assume that premiums are paid once 
per year, i.e., j = 1. In addition, we assume that the net inflows and 
outflows over one year's time from policyholder mortality, claim inci-
dence, and claim recovery are so small that we can wait until the end 
of the policy year to count them. So, instead of tracking the two way 
migration continuously, we only need to do so on policy anniversaries. 
Define De(n, m) to be the number of units of insurance disabled in 
the nth policy year and still disabled by the beginning of the mth policy 
year. 
Case 1, m> n + 1 : An insured disabled between time n + t and 
n + t + dt must have been on claim at least m - n - e - t units of time in 
order to be disabled at the beginning of the mth policy year. Therefore: 
De(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n) Ii Seem - n - e - t, n)dt. (20) 
t=O 
Case 2, m = n + 1 : This case is different because some disabled 
insureds may not have completed the elimination period by the time 
the mth policy year has begun. In this case the value of De(n, m) is: 
De(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n)[e + f=-: se(1 - e - t, n)dt]. (21) 
The first term in equation (21) accounts for those insureds who be-
come disabled during the interval (1 - e, 1) in the nth policy year. The 
net change in exposure due to incurrals/recoveries is the sum of the 
change in the number of units on claim and the number of claims ter-
minated in the preceding year by death. 
9.3 Residual Disability 
Up to this point we have assumed that a unit of insurance on claim is 
paid at the rate of $1 per year. If the insured is on residuaP3 disability, 
this may not be the case. Many disability income contracts sold today 
provide a residual disability benefit. Under such contracts, an insured 
can collect some fraction of his or her full benefit if a disability causes 
the individual to lose a portion of income but does not completely re-
move him or her from the work force. If an insured suffers a 60 percent 
loss of income because a disability renders him or her able to work only 
l3In Goldman (1990) the term residual is used in a different sense. Group and indi-
vidual terminology are not always equivalent. 
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part time or unable to do all of the duties of the occupation, he or she 
can collect 60 percent of the policy's full benefit. The benefit is a func-
tion of income lost, not amount of time unable to work. It is this fact 
that distinguishes the residual disability benefit from a partial disabil-
ity benefit. A partial benefit is based on time lost rather than income 
lost. An insured who can put in a full day's work but loses income be-
cause he or she cannot perform certain key duties could qualify for a 
residual benefit. 
To deal with residual disability benefits, we define a residual benefit 
function, Pe (y, n) to be the fraction of the total benefits paid Y years 
from now to persons who were on residual disability in policy year n. 
For example, suppose 75 percent of all claimants begin their claims on 
total disability and the remaining 25 percent begin on 50 percent of the 
base benefit, then 
Pe(O, n) = 0.75 x 1 + 0.25 x 0.5. 
Once pe(Y, n) is known, we computeBCe(n, m) bymultiplyingse(Y, n) 
and Pe(Y, n) in the integrands. For example, in the case of residual 
disability, equation (14) becomes: 
[1 fm+1-n-e-t 
BCe(n, m) = re(n)Ee(n) Jt=o y=m-n-e-t Pe(Y, n)se(Y, n)dydt. 
10 Analysis of Alternate Method 
As mentioned earlier, Bluhm and Koppel (1988, Chapter 4, pp. 83-
88) present a sample asset share calculation that purports to calcu-
late benefit cash flows using claim costs and statutory claim reserve 
changes. We will point out deficiencies in this method and indicate 
how to correct the method. In addition, we will compare the Bluhm and 
Koppel method and the method presented in this paper. 
Recall the notation used in Section 5.2. The equation used by Bluhm 
and Koppel can be restated as 
(22) 
There are two problems with this equation. First, if the CR terms are 
the statutory reserve, then the equation is not based on assumptions 
that purport to be realistic. Statutory assumptions are supposed to 
be more conservative than rpalistic assumptions in order to ensure re-
serves contain a safety margin. For equation (22) to be correct, the CR 
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terms must denote the natural claim reserve, a reserve based on realis-
tic assumptions.14 
The second problem is that the change in claim reserve needs to be 
adjusted for interest. Equation (22) now will be corrected. Let Re (n, m) 
be the natural claim reserve at the beginning of the mth policy year on 
insureds disabled in the nth policy year, let CCe(m) be the claim cost 
incurred in the mth policy year, and let i be a realistic rate of interest. 
We will calculate BCe(n, m), the benefit cash flow in the mth year to 
insureds disabled in the nth year. 
Case I, n < m: Consider Re(n, m) to be the current balance of a 
fund established to pay benefits to those insureds disabled in the nth 
policy year. Withdrawals are made to pay benefits. Interest is added, 
but no other deposits are made because the original balance of the 
fund exactly matches the present value of the benefits to be paid to the 
cohort of claimants. Then: 
Re(n, m + 1) = (1 + i)Re(n, m) - (1 + i)1/2BCe(n, m). 
We accumulate the reserve at the start of the year for a full year of inter-
est and then subtract the money withdrawn to pay benefits (accounting 
also for the half year of interest lost when the withdrawal is made). 
The result is the fund balance at the end of the year. Rearranging this 
equation yields: 
BCe(n, m) = -(1 + i)1/2[vRe(n, m + 1) - Re(n, m)]. (23) 
Case 2, n = m : At the start of the mth policy year no one could have 
been disabled in the mth policy year. Thus, the fund balance on this 
empty cohort is zero. A deposit must be made to the fund when the 
cohort is established. That deposit is the claim cost. This gives 
Re(m, m + 1) = (1 + i)1/2[CCe(m) - BCe(m, m)] 
which yields 
BCe(m, m) = _[v1/2Re(m, m + 1) - CCe(m)]. (24) 
14This criticism does not strictly apply to the sample calculation presented by Bluhm 
and Koppel because in their example the claim reserves are calculated using pricing 
assumptions. For claims less than two years old, the valuation actuary is allowed to 
measure claim reserves using experience assumptions in place of the statutory valu-
ation table. The Bluhm and Koppel example is for a disability income policy with a 
benefit period of two years. For benefit periods longer than two years, if the pricing 
actuary wishes to use this method, he or she will be obliged to calculate two sets of 
reserves: one realistic, the other statutory. 
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Summing the BCe(n, m) terms from n = 1 to n = m yields the correct 
expression for BENm (as opposed to the expression in equation (22)), 
i.e., 
BENm = CCe(m) - (1 + i)1/2(VCR~) - CR~)). (25) 
Equation (25) may appear to be a lot easier to evaluate than those 
equations with double integrals in Section 7. This is not necessarily the 
case. To use the method in Section 7, the pricing actuary must calculate 
a two dimensional array BCe(n, m)]. To project statutory book profit 
the pricing actuary also must project statutory claim reserves, among 
other things. To use equation (25), the pricing actuary must calculate 
a two dimensional array Re(n, m)] of natural claim reserves as well 
as an array of claim costs. If statutory claim reserves are different 
from natural reserves, the pricing actuary must project statutory claim 
reserves separately. The number of quantities to be calculated using 
equation (25) is larger, not smaller. 
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Appendix 
The following example will demonstrate how the formulae can be 
evaluated to estimate cash flows. We project the amount paid in ben-
efits in the first policy year and the amount of premium waived at the 
beginning of the second policy year. Ee(1) = 1000 units of insurance 
each with $100 per month of benefits ($100,000 per month in-force), 
e = 1/12 (30 day elimination period), W = 1/4 (90 day wait to qualify 
for waiver of premium), re(1) = 0.03, and tabulated values of se(Y, 1) 
are given below: 
Table Al 
Data on Se 
Y se(Y,I) Y se(y,l) 
0/12 1.00 6/12 0.38 
1/12 0.80 7/12 0.36 
2/12 0.66 8/12 0.34 
3/12 0.54 9/12 0.33 
4/12 0.44 10/12 0.32 
5/12 0.40 11/12 0.31 
6/12 0.38 12/12 0.30 
We can use equation (10) and a repeated trapezoidal rule (with monthly 
intervals) to calculate Bee (1, 1). 
From the data given, Bee (1, 1) = $9,255. 
Next we will estimate We (1, 2), the amount of premium waived at 
the start of the second policy year. Assume the annual premium rate, 
Pe, is $10 per unit. From equation (15), 
We(1,2) = Pere(1)Ee(l)[wse(w - e, 1) 
1 11-12w 1 j j - 1 
+ 12 ~ 2"[se(1-e- 12 '1)+Se(1-e----u-,I)] }=o 
$l32.00. 
